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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Economists have spent much time and effort studying the business 
cycle. The business cycle is the more or l ess regular pattern of 
expansion and contraction in economic activity around the pa th of trend 
g rowth . At a cyclical peak, economic activity is high r e lative to the 
trend and at cyclical trough, the low point in economic activity is 
reached . Inflation, economic gr owth , and unemployment are the 
charac t eristics of these business cyc les. Therefore, the government is 
expected to moderate business cycles , ideally--to achieve high 
employment, stable prices, and rapid growth . Monetary policy is one of 
the two ways to achieve these goals . The other is, of course , fiscal 
policy. 
Recently, there has been a tendency in monetary theory to focus on 
the impact of nominal money supply changes on real economic activity, 
especially the distinction between the real s~ort-run impacts of the 
predictable versus the unpredicted portion of money growth . Robert 
Lucas , among the new classical macroeconomists, asserts that, under 
certain conditions , only unanticipated movements in money affect real 
economy activities (Lucas , 1970, 1972, 1973; Sargent and Wallace , 1975, 
1976) -- the so- ca l led money neutrality hypothesis. Although many 
empirical studies have been done , there is no clear evidence showing 
that money is neutral in ever y country. 
Following recent trends in monetary economics, this paper provides 
an empirical study of money neutrality on a small open economy (Taiwan ). 
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Barro ' s s trat egy (1977) was applied using ordinary least square 
estimation. The most important distinction be tween this study and 
Barro's empirical study i s that he r e data of domestic credits were 
applied rather than Ml due to the o penness of Taiwan's economy . Because 
multicollinearity interfered with the valid interpretation of the point 
estimation, only F test s we r e a pplied t o measure the significance of the 
money movements. The r es ult s indicate that anticipated money movements 
in Taiwan are not neutral. 
Research Objectives 
The scope of this study of Taiwan' s money neutrality came from both 
theoretical and policy perspectives. Theoretically, we t r y t o prove 
that in developing countries with underdeveloped financial mar kets a nd 
excess ive government i nterve ntion ( including the interaction of the 
f i scal policy and development st r ategy) , money neutrality does not 
exis t. From a policy pe r spective, we ar e concerned abou t whether 
monetary policies in Taiwan did play an i mpo rt ant r ole i n its successful 
transit i on from an agric ultural to an industrial, from traditional to 
modern, and from a backward to an advanced economy . 
Today, because of the rapid expansion of ex ports , Taiwan is facing 
a overly rap id accumulation of fo r eign exchange which could pose a 
potential t hr ea t to Taiwan 's hard-won price stability th r ough its effect 
on the domestic money suppl y . An important goal of this study is to 
determine whether monetary policies were powerful in achieving 
government goals in the past and how influential they will be in the 
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future (i . e., maintain its high rate of economic growth , stable prices 
and improvement of income distribution). 
General Economy in Taiwan 
Taiwan is an island located in southeast Asia that covers a 
relatively small area (a land area of 36,000 square kilometers , roughly 
the size of the Netherlands) and is densely populated ( nearly 19 million 
people in 1984) . The openness of its economy is evidenced by the share 
of exports and imports in its GNP as 48.7 percent and 45 .7 percent, 
r espect ivel y , in 1981 (Wu , 1985, p . 11) . 
Since the 1960s, Taiwan has experienced an extraordinarily rapid 
economic growth: 
1960s 
1970s 
1983 
1984 
9.1% GNP gr owth rate, 
10.1% (despite two o il -price shocks), 
7.9% (U .S . $51.03 billion), and 
10.9% (U . S. $57.84 billion) (Council for Economic 
Planning and Development , 1985, p . 3) . 
In 1984, per capita GNP reached $3 , 067 in U. S. dollars . According to 
Shirley Kuo ( 1983), much of the credit for Taiwan ' s economic success is 
due to its " export-l ed" growth strategy , under which income generated 
through exports of labor-inte.nsive, light manuf ac tur ing has been 
translated into capital investment and expanded capacity to produce 
furthe r expor ts . Government policies played a very important role in 
setting all these remarkab le records. 
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Banking system 
The Central Bank of China is the monetary au t hority in Taiwan. The 
funct ion of the Central Bank is like the Federal Reserve in the United 
Stat es . Commercial banks se rve a wide variety of savers a nd those with 
needs for funds , and can be considered the major institutions which 
handle checking a ccoun ts and through whi ch the Central Bank expands or 
contracts t he money . They are also authorized to sell and buy foreign 
exchange. The government holds nearly half of t he shares in eve ry major 
commercial bank . Also, there i s a Pos t a l Savi ngs System which pe r fo r ms 
contract policy by r edepos iting t o the Central Bank. In add it ion , 
credit uni ons , investment trusts and seve ral br anches of well - known 
f or eign banks a r e also found in Taiwan . 
Open ma rket operati on 
The Centra l Bank controls domestic credits through the open marke t. 
Because the government owns half of the s ha res of the comme rci al banks , 
commercial banks a re t he most important financial inte r mediaries between 
the gove rnment and the public . 
Dual financial system 
"An official money marke t was established in 1976 to pave the way 
for more flexible interes t rate movements and t o channel f i na ncial 
savings from the unor ganized private money market t o business ," 
according t o Shirley Kuo ( 1983 , p. 32 1). Neve rtheless, a well - known 
unorganized private l oan system exists parallel t o the off i cial sys t em. 
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The reason is that government investment s in commercial banks are under 
the supervision of the Supervisor y Yuan (a watchdog institution of equal 
standing t o the Executive and the Legislature) . A bad de bt tends t o be 
interpreted as a loss of a state asset . To avoid bad loans, commercial 
banks are usually bound by a very strict rules governing collateral; and 
loan officers usually exagge rate the risks involved in lending to a 
small, private business or to companies that a r e not clearly in a 
favo red industry . Since most loan requesters (usually they are small 
scale businesses) can not meet the collateral required by the banks , 
private loans with higher interest r a tes than commercia l banks exist t o 
meet their needs. 
Organization 
Chapter II provides the basic theoretical background relevant t o 
the money neutrality hypothes is. The concepts of natu r al Tate 
hypothesis, rationa l expectations , and the r ole of mone t ary policy wi ll 
be discussed. Also, previous empirical studies on money neut rality will 
be examined. Chapter III specifies the model and data that a re adopted 
in this study. The detailed estimation procedure and test r esults are 
reported. In the final chapter , conclusions of t his resea rch and 
suggestions fo r further research are presented . 
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CHAPTER II . LITERATURE REVIEW 
A major goal of economic policy is to improve cyc lical performance 
by maintaining stable prices, rapid growth and high employment. In 
order to achieve this goal , governments have at their command two broad 
classes of policy: fiscal policy and monetary policy . In the United 
States, monetary policy is controlled by the Federal Reserve System. 
The instruments of monetary policy are changes in the stock of money; 
changes in the interest rate (the discount rate) at which the Fed lends 
mo ne y to banks; and other forms of control ove r t he banking system . On 
the other hand, fiscal policy is under the control of the Congr ess, and 
usually is initiated by the executive branch of the government . The 
instruments of fiscal policy are tax rates and government spending . The 
present paper is concerned only with monetary policy. 
Do changes in the money stock have impacts on econom ic variables? 
Is stabilization o~ monetary policy desired? Thes e quest i ons have been 
raised by economists and have expanded interest in empirical study for 
the last two decades. Macro rational expectations models (MRE) were 
developed in an effort to explain the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
The MRE models propose the now well-known conclusion that anticipated 
short-run monetary stabilization policies do not infl ue nce real economic 
variables. Of course , this ineffectiveness proposition is based on a 
pair of critical assumptions--the existence of the natural rate 
hypothesis and the rational expectations hypothesis. 
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The following is a br ief l iterature r eview examining the natural 
rate hypothesis , r ational expectations, the role of monetary policy, and 
some pr evious empi rical studies on money neutrality, to form the 
theor etical backg r ound fo r this empirical study. 
Natur a l Rate Hypothesis 
The natur al r ate hypothesis is derived from the general equilibrium 
of l abo r and product markets . In a literal sense, the natural r ate 
hypo t hesis proposes that given the microeconomic structure of the 
economy, the behavior of pr ivate economic agents is based on 
approximately co rr ect expectations about the rate of inflation that 
gener ate unique levels of aggregate output and employment, denoted as 
"natural levels. 111 Devi at ions of out put and employment fr om their 
natur al levels are associated with deviations of expec ted from actual 
inflation r ates rather than inflation, per se. In ot her words, the 
Natural Rate Hypo t hesis suggests that unanticipated, rather than 
anticipated , money supply changes influences real economic variables . 
The natural r ate hypothesis ' s appearance originated in response to 
the initia l Phillips curve li te r ature. The empirical Phillips curve, 
based on Un ited Kingdom data from 1861-1957 and analyzed by A. W. 
Phil lips, shows a negative relationship between unemployment and 
inflation. The Phillips curve implicitly assumes that the trade- off 
rela t ionship between low unemployment r ates and high inflation rates is 
1 
Here , the term private agents refers to households and 
pr oducers; the term expected inflation rate covers both the expected 
wage and ex pee ted pr ice trends . 
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independent of both past and current moneta r y and fiscal pol i cy . Only 
if policy maker s are willing t o s u ffe r the high inflation which is 
associated with the chosen l evel of output and un employmen t, can t hey 
reach their desired l ow unemployment r a t e (see Figure 2 . 1) . The 
Phillips Curve was not as s table when United States data was analyzed 
( see Figure 2.2). To expl ain why the Phillips curve relationship did 
no t hold for t he United States, the natural rate hypothe sis was 
developed by Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968). The natu ral ra te 
hypothesis implies that deviations of expected from actual inflation 
rates will affect unemployment and output levels in the short - run, while 
t he Philli ps curve i s a vertical line i n the long-run at the natural 
rate. Furthermore, natur al r ates may var y over time and can be altered 
by improving technology, increasing capital, or chang ing the st r ucture 
of the labo r marke t. 
Ra tiona l Expectations 
The idea of rational expec tations i s a recent revolution in 
macroeconomics . It is distinct from but also complementary to concepts 
about the relation between government behavior and business cycles . It 
proposes a general theore ti cal approach to the study of expectations. 
Rat ional expec tat ion is the application of the pr inciple of 
rational behavior fo r individual agen t s and the government to form and 
use all obtainable information. Agents do not waste i n forma tion , and 
will not make systematic mistakes when forecasting fluctuatio ns in the 
economy . Models that use this hypothesis have been deve loped by Lucas 
0970, 1972, 1973 ) and Sargent and Wallace 0976 ), among othe r s . 
c 
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a 
Une mployment ra te 
aThe Phillips curve suggests a trade- off between inflation 
and unempl oymen t. Less unemployment can always be obtained by 
incurring mor e i nflation--or inflation can be reduced by allowing 
more unemployment . 
Figure 2 . 1. A Phillips curve 
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0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 
Unemployment rate (percent) a 
aThis figure diagrams the actual history of inflation and 
unemployment in the United States since 1963-1982 . The periods 
of 1963-69, 1976-79 , and 1980-82 f it the general shape of the 
Phillips curve but in be tween there are periods where inflation 
and unemployment both increase or sometimes decrease (see 
Dornbusch and Fischer , 1984) . 
Fi gure 2.2 . Inflation a nd unemployment 
14.0 
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I n general, the rational expectations model has three majo r 
concer ns . First , it assumes that private agents know the structur e of 
the economy , so that given current and past information t hey can foresee 
correctly on average the ef fects of monetary and fis cal actions . 
Second, private agents and the government ga ther and use in formation 
efficiently . Efficiency means that the amount of r esources agents 
devote to gathering and using informatio n i s such that t he marginal 
alternative cost of resources equ als the marginal benefit f r om t he 
information. In other words, the agents use "all" relevant and 
obtainab le information. The third important component of rational 
expectation models is the spec ification of the availabi lity and 
useability of information , because the ease of assessing information 
affects the po t ency of monetary policy . If all policy rules are 
announced (or are not announced but follow cer tain rules and are easily 
observed ) , r a t ional expecta tions of the private agen ts would render 
monetary policies ineffective . Misspecifications of expec tations may 
le ad to monetary nonneutral ity in the economy. The above three 
components ar e the most important cont ributions of the r a tional 
expectations hypothes i s . 
Mo ney Neutrality 
As mentioned i n the last section , the concept of money neutrali ty 
comes from the association of the natural rate hypothesis and the 
rational expectation assump tion. Lucas (1973) and Sargent and Wallace 
(1975) have deve l oped so-call ed MRE (macro r a t ional expectations ) 
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models , and have derived an important neutrality result : because 
economic agents anticipate changes in aggregate demand policy, 
government actions will not evoke output or employment responses . The 
mo ney neutrality hypothesis reflects the controversy that deterministic 
feedback pol i cy r ul es wil l have no impact on output fluc t ua t ions in the 
economy . Con t ra r iwise , the money nonneutrality hypothesis asserts that 
business cycles do depend in a significant way on an important subset of 
monetar y policies. 
Actually , neu t rality and nonneutrality are not contradictory. 
Neutrality does not say that systematic government behavior in general 
cannot affect aggregate output and employmen t; monetary policies have 
not been histor ical l y important factors i n generating real macroeconomic 
fluctuatio ns . Rather, neutrality emphasizes only that the systematic 
part of monetar y actions have no effect on the aggregate . It says that 
economic aggregates wi l l be affected only if the microeconomic structure 
of the economy is altered to change the natural leve l of aggregate 
variables. 
As the neutrality hypothesis was the combination of the natural 
rate hypothesis and the rational expectation hypothesis, it includ es 
several important assumptions: first, private agents know the structur e 
of the economy , and they attach subjective probabilities to the possible 
effects of perceived or predicted monetary and fiscal actions which are 
equal to the true pr obabilities associated with these effects; and 
second, pr ivate agents adjust their behavior in accord with these 
perceptions so aggregate output and employment satisfy market - clearing 
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l evels. These t wo assumptions imp l y that priva te agents form correct 
expectations abo ut the inflation rate. Given a natural rate , the 
hypothesis implies that pred i ctable monetary movements do not on average 
affect the t ime pattern of differences between actual and natural 
levels. The third assumption is that the public can perceive systematic 
responses to business cycle developments even if monetary policies are 
not announced. The above th r ee assumptions imply money neutrality . 
The r easons for money nonneutrality can be outlined as follows: 
1. Incomplete information causes in correct expectat i ons about the 
rate of inflation . For examp le, if the government per forms pol icy 
randomly instead of conducting systematic monetary pol i cies , then the 
public has no way to form correct expectations; or, due to ignorance , 
the public may not use all available information and do not form the 
expect ations co rrectly . 
2. Government policies do not perform as expected . The actual 
performance may be quite different from the desired one . For example , 
technological pr oblems may cause government plan s to go awry . The 
larger the variance of autho r i t y ' s monetary behavior, the smaller the 
effec t s of unpredic table and imperceptible monetary actions on aggregate 
levels (Lucas, 1973; Barro, 1976) . 
3. Nonmar ket - c l earing situations may occur in the economy . This 
ass ump tion implies tha t although po licy rules are perceivable but not 
predictable sufficientl y in advance, they can affect economic activities 
(Begg , 1982). For example , if multiperiod wage contracts exist, even 
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though the public has rational expectations and full information at 
period t to period t+l, they were locked into period t - l's contract. 
Besides the above mentioned reasons, price rigidity and the 
allocation of traders across markets in each period (Lucas , 1970), and 
under some particular economic st ructur es , pr ices convey the real and 
nominal monetary disturbance only imperfectly, leading money to be 
nonneutral . 
The Role of Monetary Policy 
A conventional belief on the importance of monetary policy for 
stabi lization purposes was de rived from the Phillips cu r ve . According 
to that belief, governments can exacerbate or mitigate the business 
cyc l es at their will. As mentioned in the previous sect ion, the actual 
unstab l e Phillips curve revealed that the relationship between inflation 
and unemployment ar e more sophisticated than expected . The natural rate 
hypothesis, which explained the instability of the Phillips c urve, 
implies that only if the monetary authority can cause the price 
expectations to deviate from actual price levels can the policy have 
impacts on real economic variable. Thus, monetary policy may be 
effective only i n the short- run period (Taylo r, 1983). In the long-run, 
agents through tri al and error will not make mistakes in forming price 
expec tations. 
Now, following t he MRE model, economists totally deny the monetary 
policy role for stabilization purposes. Because MRE assumes agents can 
perceive the money supply changes , moneta r y policy is impotent even in 
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the sho rt run . According to the MRE hypothesis, monetary policy will 
have effects only when it is unexpected, or under other specia l 
circumstances. For example, Barro emphasized that besides the MRE 
assumptions-- prices and quantities a re competitively de termined by 
market - clearing relationships, and the expectations of future variables 
are formed rationally--for money policy t o be effective, the agen t ' s 
information should be incomplete , i.e . , the gove r nment has an 
info rmation advantage . 
The MRE model and its basic algebraic mechanism can be generated as 
follows: 
where 
Demand: Yt - bP + CX 
t t 
Expectations : p * t 
yt output or unemployment (real economic variables) , 
Y* natural level of aggregates, 
pt actual prices at time period t, 
Pc* price expectations , 
( l ) 
(2) 
(3) 
xt gove rnment policy instrument; here we only refer to money 
supply, 
It-l all information available at time t-1, and 
a "white noise", random error t e rm and E( Ut) o. 
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Under the market-clearing equilibrium situation, equation ( 1) is 
equal to equation (2) . 
We obtain the following reduced form equation: 
p 
t 
l /a+b(aP *+ex - Y* - u ). 
t t t 
By the assumption of rational expectations, we ge t 
Pt*= E[Pt /I t-1] 
E[l/a+b(aPt* +ext - Y* - Ut)] 
l /a+b[aE(Pt* + eE(Xt) - E(Y*) - E(Ut)] 
substitute in E(Pt*) = Pt*; E(Y*) 
p * 
t 
l /a+b[aP * + eE(X ) - Y*]. 
t t 
Subtracting (5) from (4) 
= l/a+b{C[X - E(X )] - U } . 
t t t 
Put equation (6) to equation (1) 
y - y * t t = a/ (a+b){C[Xt - E(Xt)J - Ut} + Ut 
= [ a e I ( a+ b ) ] ( X -EX ) + [ b I ( a+ b ) ] U 
t t t 
0 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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where Xt - E(Xt) is equal to the unsystematic component of 
gove r nment policy . If people with rat ional expectations know t he policy 
rule, and the gove r nment pe r forms the policy following the policy rule , 
then t he t e rm ~ - E(Xt) is a ze r o- mean random variable . Therefor e , 
the deviations of actual output (or unemployment rate) from its natura l 
level are entirely random. So , the MRE model postulates that 
anticipated monetary po licies a re impotent unless the gove rnment 
manipulates the unsystematic componen t of t he monetary policy rule . 
Pr evious Empirical Tests of Neutrality 
It is difficult to model and test neutrality within a structu r al 
macroeconomic framework . Many macroeconomists have focused on 
deve l oping tests within the context of red uced- forms of output or 
unemployment models (Barro, 1977, 1978 ; Barro and Rush , 1980 ; Mishkin , 
1982 , 1983 ; Hoffman and Schlage nhauf, 1982 ; and Herrick , 1983) . 
Robe rt Barro i nitiated much of the empirical work on t he neutrality 
hypothesis with a series of papers testing the impact of unanticipated 
money on aggregate United St ates output, unemployment, and prices . He 
first applied annual data and then ex tended the model to quarterly 
data . 
His mode l, whi ch is also the general fo r mat of tests on t he new 
classical macro neut rality proposition (ant icipated money does not 
affect real out pu t, only unanticipated money matters), specifies real 
economic activity as a function of ant i cipat ed and unantici pated money 
gr owt h . 
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As the anticipa ted and unan ticipated components of money are 
unobservable var iab l es , actual money growth (Mt) was decomposed into 
i t s anticipated and unanticipated components in order to complete the 
tes t . First , he es t imated a money growt h model via OLS (Or dinary Least 
Squares): 
Mt = Ztr + Et 
(Ma + Mu) . 
t t 
(8) 
Zt is a vecto r of var iables r elevant to forecasting mo ney growth at time 
t - 1 . Et ls the fo r ecast er ror and assumed to be uncorrelated with any 
i n fo rmation ava il able at t-1 . Pr edicted values from the model (M a) 
t 
were t reated as antici pated money; r esiduals (Mtu) wer e t r eated as 
unanticipated money . 
Second, he substituted these anticipated and unanticipated values 
into the output (or unemployment) equation to estimate the real variable 
r espo nse . The unr est r icted r educed fo rm of the response variable is 
y = 
t 
2 
E 
i=O 
A.M _a + 
l t - i 
2 
E 
i=O 
B.M .u + ex 
l t-l t 
+ v 
t 
whe r e Xe is a vecto r of othe r explanatory variables. 
(9) 
Barro ' s fo r ecast i ng model of U. S. money growth was specified as a 
l inear function of past money growth and a set of other predete rmined 
var iables . Specifically , 
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2 
M a
0
+ 1: b.M . + C1UN 1+d 0
FEDV +£ 
t i=l 1 t - 1 t - t t 
( l ) (2) 
where ( 1) equals expl anatory variables of moneta r y movemen t his t o ry and 
(2) equals exp l a nato r y variables from business cycle characteristics 
(only f ocusing in gove rnment's policy) . 
If we look at his equat i on more ca refully , we f ind that he 
gene r ated the money s upply movements in the Uni ted States in two parts . 
One is the previous histo r y of money supply itself and the othe r is from 
business char acte r istics of unemployment and a measure of government 
expenditures rela ti ve to normal l evels . 1 His study focuses on t he 
central policy rule and igno res other mino r fac t o r s . For this reason , 
othe r economists criticized Barro ' s model as a reaction function of the 
centra l bank . The fo recasting model was estimated by OLS to generate 
the anticipated and unanticipated noney portions needed fo r estimation 
of the output (or unemployment) responses to monetary shocks . 
He also specified the output equation as follows: 
2 
u 
a 1 + 1: B .M i + d 1T +d 2MILt i=O i t-
where T is a time t rend , and MIL is a measure of military conscri pt ion 
1FEDV = Log(FED) 
federal expenditures . 
unemployment rate . 
- [Log(FED)]* . [Log(FED)J* - the normal value of 
UNt -1 = Log[u/(l-u)lt-1• u annual ave rage 
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(Barro , 1977 , pp. 106-107). His results supported the neutr ality 
h ypo thesis . 
Barro and Rush also performed a quar t e rl y t est of the above equa-
tion and fo und that unanticipated money had a statistically significant 
positive impact on output and a negative impact on unemployment. The 
results from Barro and from Barro and Rush we r e interpreted as a st r ong 
confirmation of the new class i ca l macroeconomic proposition, and the 
empirical evidence supported money neutrality. The r esults were t aken 
to ind icate t hat unanticipated money growt h significantly affected r eal 
economic variables, but they also spu rred the controversy and further 
empirical testing . Mishkin ' s criti que has generated the most interest . 
The main diffe r ence between the Mishkin and Barro procedures 
concern s the econometric methodology . Barro ' s two-step me thod assumes 
the parame ters estimated in the money g r owth equation (equation (8)) are 
the true paramete r values when he es timat es t he ou tput equat i on ( 9 ) , 
i gno r i ng the possible covari a nce of the parameters estimated in the two 
equations. If the covar iance is nonze r o , then t he two- stage estimates 
are not efficient . The stand ard e rror and t- statistics will not be 
theore tically appropriate ; but the paramete r estimates in the t wo - step 
procedure are still consistent . 
Mis hkin' s t es t of the antic ipated money neutrality jo int ly 
est imates the money and out put equations as a simultaneous system . It 
then allows fo r information cr ossover s be tween equations whi l e 
estimating the parameters a nd provide more efficient est i mates of the 
Ai, Bi and C in equation (9) . He used an aggregate level of U. S. 
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output data , and in par ticular he also used long lags--twenty quarters . 
The r esults showed that in t he l onger lag model anticipated money 
neutrality was reject ed , while i n the short er lag length model 
neutrality of anticipated money still held. 
Following Da rby ' s attempts to test whethe r anticipated changes in 
monet a r y policy are neutral across countries (the first empi r ical study 
out side the United St ates) , Hoffman and Schlagenhauf (1982) t ested money 
neutrality on aggregate real output for six count ries . Their approach 
basically follows Frederic Mi shkin ' s methodology; mixed results were 
o btained from those countries which included Canada , Ge r many , Ital y , 
Japan , the United Kingdom and t he United States . 
However, r easons for money nonneutrality in each individual economy 
are diffe r ent , so numerous models have been presented . There is no 
c lea r empirical confirmation or con t rad i ction of the theo retical 
proposition that anti ci pa t ed money gr owth is neutral . And should 
monetary policy makers wish t o manipulate policies, it is a very 
i mpor tant task for them to find the s t a tus of money neu t rality for t heir 
own economy' s st ructure. The money neu trali t y hypothesis is 
theoretically and empirically a cu rrent issue . 
Barre's st rategy is the simpl est and most cons istent one in testing 
the money neutrality hypothesis; t he r efor e, the research presen t ed he r e 
follows his framework to empi ri cally t es t for the neutrali t y of money in 
Taiwan's economy . 
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CHAPTER I I I . EMPIRICAL WORK 
The hypothesis that fo r ms the basis of t his empirical s tudy is that 
only unanticipated movements in money affect real economic variables- -
the so- called money neutrality hypothesis . 
Neutrality means that t hr ough monetary po l icy a change in aggrega t e 
demand , incorpo rated i nto t he agents' behavior (anticipated) , will 
provoke no out pu t or employment response . This result implies that any 
determi nistic feed back policy rule (anticipated) is as good as any 
stabilization policy rule . Until recently, empirical studies have not 
given clear evidence t o suppo rt the hypothesis of anticipated money 
neutrality . According t o some economi s t s , monetary policy may have 
nonneutral effects on the r ea l economic variables (Mishkin, 1982; 
Hoffman and Schlagenhauf, 1982) . 
The purpose of this empi rical study is t o test whethe r data f r om 
Taiwan supports the neutrality hypo thesis . The model he re basical l y 
includes two types of equations : a monetary gr owt h equat i on , and a real 
output equation. 
Model Set-Up 
Money gr owth equation 
In order to test the neutrality hypo thesis , i t is necessary t o 
differenti a t e both anti c ipa t ed and unantic ipa t ed components of mone tary 
movements . The first step is t o specify a money growth equation using 
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a l l relevan t i nfo r mation (incor porating rational expectations) t o 
fo recast money movements one period ahead as the anticipated money . The 
res i duals from t his eq uation are taken as the unanticipated component of 
money . The eq ua tion is 
whe r e DNt is t he actual growth rate of the money stock , and Zt is a 
vector of exogenous and (or ) predetermined variables . Actually, the 
abo ve equation is based on the hypothesis t hat the growth rate of money 
s t ock has been sys t emat ica l ly related to (o r determined by) a set of 
obse r ved variabl es , say Zt ' In addition , there is a component c t 
wh i ch i s r a ndom or unpredi c t ab l e . Should economic agen t s r a t iona l ly 
fo r m expecta ti ons a bout moneta r y gr owth , then the predicted money growth 
wil l equal Zt . The r e f ore , the unantic i pated mone y growth wil l be 
ct = DMt - DMt . This model has been applied by Mishkin ( 1982) and 
Ba r ro (1976) . 
In t his s t udy , t he i nfo r mation vector Zt is formed by variables 
of gove r nment expenditures , lagged values of real GNP , and lagged values 
of money growth i t se l f . The form is 
6 
a 0 + [ aiDMt - i + a 7FEDV t + a 8Yt-l + a 9Yt _2 + ct . i = l 
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Real output equation 
Typically monetary nonneutral effects are considered based on t he 
changes of the unemployment rate , or real output. We onl y consider one 
variable--output . Ou tput is chosen as the dependent variable because 
the unemployment rate in Taiwan is too low and too stable to be 
sensitive enough for us to test the neutrality hypothesis . 1 
The basic form of the out put equation is 
where Yt is log ( r ea l GNP), and is viewed as consisting of two 
components: a natural level (ytn) and a transitory or cyclical 
level (Ut) of output. In this study , the natural rate of output 1s 
explained by a constant, a time trend and seasonal adjustment var iables . 
The transitory part of output includes lagged values of itself 
(U t - l' Ut_2 , ... ) and the impacts from anticipated and 
unanticipated money movements . 
In the econometric procedure, we regress quarterly Yt on 
time- trend variables T, r 2, and r3; seasonal adjustment variables 
D1, D2, and D3; and an inte rcept . Then the estimated value of 
Yt is subtracted from the actual Yt to get transitory output--t he 
1rn Taiwan , the unemployment rate is low and stable as a result 
of cultural characteristics. People are diligent workers and are 
embarrassed to receive subsidy . Although low income subsidies are 
available, no unemployment benefits are provided. Finally , unemployment 
statistics are defined differently than in the United States; the 
standar ds for self-employment are different. 
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residuals Ut . This transito r y output is the dependent variable i n a 
regression on the monetary factors and lagged values of itself without 
an intercept. Ut need not be compl e t e l y random, because we expect it 
to be affected by unanticipated monetary growth and perhaps serial 
dependence or lagged adjustment on lagged value of transito r y output 
itself. So, more precise descriptions of the output equations in this 
study are 
Ylt Log(real GNP)t, 
(lQ) 
(11) 
Variable Co nstruct ion 
The Barro series of empirical studies in 1977 and 1978 were a major 
breakthrough in testing money neutrality. Although there have been some 
criticisms of his work, no more simple and better strategies to test 
money neutrality exist . This study basically r eplicates Barro ' s 
strategy although the variables have been modified as needed. 
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Monetary growth equation 
Domestic credit Barre's model, unlike this thesis, was 
developed for a closed economy . He used nominal money supply (Ml) to 
analyze the changes in monetary growth. In an open economy , with fixed 
or a dirty floating exchange like Taiwan, the nominal money supply is 
endogenous (B lejer and Fernandez, 1980, p. 87) . However, domest ic 
credit contains claims on the government, claims on private enterpri ses, 
and claims on government enterprises all of which are under the 
authority of the government, so that we can treat domestic credit as an 
instrument of monetary policy in Taiwan. Therefore, domestic credit 
rather than Ml is the dependent var iable in the monetary growth 
equation . The monetar y growth variable can be denoted as follows: 
M = domestic credit, 
Gove rnment expenditure variable (FEDV) Because government 
expenditures are financed by debt creation, taxes, and money issue, all 
of which can change the monetary growth rate, we take a measure of 
gove rnment expenditur es as one of the independent variables in the 
monetary growth equation. The variable FEDV is denoted as 
FEDV Log(FED) - [Log(FED)]* 
where FED = nominal government expenditur e/GNP deflater real GNP , and 
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[Log ( FED))* is the "normal" val ue o f FED. In the other words, FEDV i s 
"extra" gov ernment expenditures rela tive to "normal ." And, the no rm a l 
value [Log( FED ) )* is generated from the adap t ive formu la, used by 
Barr o , 
[Log (FED) ]*t = S[Log(FED)]t + Cl - S) [Log(FED)]t _1* 
where S ' s value i s chosen from the one with the best fit i n the mo netar y 
g r owth equation. 
The r e ason we choose FEDV instead of FED as an ex planatory variabl e 
is bec ause FEDV captures the r evenue motive for money creation. 
Increases in the federal budget are f inanced by both money is sue and 
taxation. 1 Over t he long r un, more tax-rais ing capi ta l might be 
invested, lessening the need t o financ e expenditures th r ough money 
issue . But in the sho r t run, money issue may be the most timely and 
convenient wa y to finance the extra governmen t expenditures. The r efor e , 
only increases in gov ernment expend itur es relative t o normal will induce 
monetary g r owth rate changes (Barro , 1977, pp. 101-103) . This 
hypothesis has also been supported by Bar r e ' s empirica l evidence where 
he tested the hypo thesis that only the difference between Log(FED) and 
1G . f' overnment expenditures are inanced by r evenues of government 
debt, taxes, and money issue . Since gove rnmen t debts can be pe r ceived 
as fu ture taxes (see Barro, 1974), we actually r efe r to taxes and money 
i ssues as the only two means t o r aise the revenue. We can con s id er 
government tax-raising as a micro indus try . The amount of capit a l 
inves tment in this industry depends on the "long- run" variab l e s such as 
governme nt expenditures and nation al income . 
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[Log(FED)]* influences money expansion. He used data for 1941 to 1973 
from the United States. 
Note that FEDV is no t normalized, and its average value is not 
zero . 
Measure of lagged r eal output (Y t - l'Yt_2 ) 
The reason for taking 
lagged values of real output is to think about the moneta r y r esponse 
from fluctuations in the business cycle. Money growth might be expec t ed 
to respond to these variables. For example, there could be a 
counter- cyclical policy response of money to the level of economic 
activity . A relatively low lagged va l ue of Y will encourage the 
government to have an easy monetary policy to stimulate investment . 
This is called the monetary policy with feedback rule (Barro, 1976). 
Lagged values of money growth (DMt-i ) Government performance in 
monetary policy is like the rational behavior of private economic 
agents in that both learn from previous experience. The lagged values 
of money growth are the most obvious and easily obtainable information 
fo r the government to follow. These l agged dependent variables are used 
to pick up any elements of serial dependence, or lagged adjustment that 
have not been captured by the other independent variables . 
Only six lags are considered (see Barro's empirical study on two 
lagged annual data). 1 Of course, some of the insignificant lags may 
be eliminated according to standard econometric principles . 
1Actually, following Barre's empirical study, eight lags are 
applied . Estimated coefficients of the last two lags turned out to be 
insignificant . Therefore, only s ix lags are used . 
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From the above variables , the monetary growth equa tion form is 
6 
ao + L aiDMt-i + a7~EDVt + a8Yt-l +a9Yt-2 +Et · 
i=l 
Therefore, the unanticipa ted mone tary growth part will be 
DMRt 
whe re DMR unanticipat ed monetary growth, 
DM act ual monetary gr owth , 
EDM estimated value from eq uation (12), 
anticipated mone tary growth. 
Real output equation 
(12) 
Seasonal adjustment dummy variables (D l, o2 , o3 ) and time trend 
The seasonal adjustment dummy and time trend 
variables are used t o capture the secular movement of "normal" output . 
The three time tre nd variables - -T , T2 , and T3--are included in the 
output equation as indicated by a residual plot. 
Dt , 02 1 and 03 are dummy variables which are equal to one 
(and zero otherwi se) when the second , third and fourth qua rt er data are 
applied, respectively (Johns ton , 1984, p. 234) . All observations on the 
variable Y1 are qua rterly time series wit hout adjustment and a r e 
likely to display a seasonal movement . For example, at the Chinese New 
Year in Taiwan, just as in western countries at Christmas time, the 
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demand for goods increases . The dummy variables are used to get a 
deseasonalized series of real output. 
Transitory output (Y 2 ) 
Y
2 
is the real output induced by 
monetary shock or the lagged value of itself. Y2 is obtained by 
removing the time trend and seasonal movement from output . In other 
words, the Y2 values are the residuals in equation (10) : Ylt = b0 
+ b D + b D + b D + b T + b T2 + b r 3 + U (see model set - up 
11 22 33 4 5 6 t 
section). 
Contemporaneous and lagged values of monetary growth movement 
Based on our hypothesis that only unanticipated money affects real 
economic variables, the unanticipated money variables (DMR) are, of 
course, the most important explanatory variables of transitory output . 
The inclusion of lagged values of DMR implies that the pe r sistent output 
effects from money s hoc k will be carried fo rward into future periods 
through stock variables such as productive capital . 
Lagged value of Y
2 
Previous transitory output may have positive 
effects on contemporaneous r ea l output. If the previous Y2 is 
relatively large, increas ing productive capital acc umulation, persistent 
effects of lagged Y2 values on current levels will be evident. For 
this reason, we use lagged Y2 as one of the explanatory variables in 
the real output equation . 
Given all the above mentioned variabl es , the two output equations 
are as follows : 
(13) 
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4 
E CiDMRt-i + CSY2(t -l) +Vt 
i=O 
Data Utilized 
The sample period covered for this study 1s 1973 to 1985 . 
Quarterly data we r e used . Thus, the entire data set contains 52 
observations . The data required to study monetary growth and real 
output here are 1) domestic credit , 2) GNP, 3) nominal government 
ex pe ndit ures , and 4) the GNP deflator . 
(14) 
Domestic c r edit data are published 1n Financial Sta tistics Monthly, 
Taiwan Dist r ict by the Economic Research Department of the Central Bank 
of Taiwan . Domestic credit data are collected monthly and are 
categorized as follows: claims on the government, claims on government 
enter prises , and claims on private ente rpri ses. Therefore, the domestic 
cr edit variables were constructed by cal cul a ting the average for each 
three-month period and adding the averages fo r each of the above items 
to get quarterly data . 
GNP , the GNP deflator, and government expenditur e data were 
obta ined f rom several issues of Quar t e rly Income Statistics in Taiwan 
Ar ea by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Stati stics . 
The GNP defl ator uses 1981 as the base year . 
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Empirical Resu lt s and Di scussion 
Monetary growth equation 
Choice of B All data fo r est i mating the moneta ry growth 
equation are avai l able except FEDV. Hence, prior to est imating the 
monetary growth equation, we need a B value to get FEDV. Barro did not 
cl early explain how to choose B value for the adaptive formula of 
[Log(FED) ]* . Here, several B values were arbitrarily chosen for the 
money g r owth equation that was explained in the last section . 
Explanato r y variables of lagged real output were excluded becaus e they 
eventually turned out to have insignificant coefficients . The relevant 
values of R2 and the Durbin- Watson statistic ar e r eported in 
Table 3 . 1. Because all Durbin-Watson values are very c l ose to 2 , we may 
assume tha t autocorrelation is not a serious problem. Thus , the B 
values can be selected simp l y by comparing the R2 values to determines 
which s pecification of the money growth equations pr ovides the best 
fit. 
Table 3.1. R2 values of DM equation with different B values 
0.05 
0 . 10 
o. 15 
0. 20 
0 . 25 
0 . 30 
0 . 6181 
0. 6780 
0. 6843 
0 . 6790 
0.6737 
0.6566 
D. W. 
1. 94 7 
1. 935 
l. 921 
l. 912 
1. 916 
l. 950 
where 
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FED Log(real GNP) , 
DMt a0 + a 1DMt - l + a 2DMt_2 + a 3m\-J + a4DMt _4 + a 5DMt-S 
+ a6DMt _6 + a1FEDV t + £t , 
FEDV = Log(FED) - (Log(FED) ]*, a nd 
[Log(FED)]*c= B[Log(FED)]t + (1-B)[Log(FED))*t- l' 
Figure 3. l traces the R2 trend responses to B values between zero 
and one . We find that when B is l ess t han O. LS, R2 increases as B 
incr eases ; and when the value greater than 0 . LS , R2 decreases as B 
increases . Ther efo r e , a B value of 0 . 15 was selected because the 
highest value of R2 was reached at that point (see Figu re 3. 1) . Once 
the B value was set, the FEDV va l ues were calculated and are listed in 
Table 3 . 2 . A SAS pr ogram was used to construct the FEDV values . 
Selection of explanatory variables Once t he FEDV variable is 
constructed, we can estimate the moneta r y gr owth equation . Firs t, t ran 
regressions on three va r iables : FEDV , lagged values of Y and lagged 
values of DM , all of which were defined in the previ ous section . T~e 
purpose of r eg ression analysis is to determine whether the variables 
explain movements of monetary growth . As explained in t he previous 
section , the adaptation coefficient e = 0 . 15 was us ed in the adaptive 
formula for normal value of government expenditur es : [Log(FED)]t* = 
B[Log(FED)] + (l-B)[Log(FED)J i* · The estimated coefficients are 
t t-
es timated coeff i cient s are shown in Table 3. 3 . 
The t-ratios show clearly that OM and FEDV perform well as 
explanator y variables . However, the l agged Ys have many insignificant 
coefficients , throwing doubt on their explanato ry powe r in the equati on . 
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0.68 
0 . 66 
0 . 64 
0.62 
0 . 60 
0 .05 o.10 0 .1 5 0.20 0 .2 5 0.3 0 
8 values 
Figure 3 . l . R values of DM equation with differen t 6 values 
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Tabl e 3. 2 . Val ue of gov e rnm e nt expend itur es (B = o. 15) 
Year FED FEDV Year FED FEDV 
1973 . 1 349 . 09 0.0000 1981. 1 713 . 94 0. 16 76 
2 435 . 34 0 . 1877 2 714 . 57 0 . 1432 
3 320 . 70 -0 . 1002 3 692 . 87 0. 0955 
4 324 . 55 -0.0751 4 695 . 09 0 . 0839 
1974.1 309 . 49 -0. L024 1982.l 785 . 20 0. 1749 
2 331. 54 - 0 . 030 l 2 774 . 00 0. 1365 
3 346 . 39 o. 0117 3 752 . 77 0 . 0924 
4 345 .16 0 . 0069 4 747 . 61 o. 0727 
1975.1 375 . 57 0. 0776 1983 .1 8ll . 72 0 . 1317 
2 399 . 24 0 . 1180 2 810 . 76 0 . 1109 
3 36 7. 4 7 0 . 02 98 3 785 . 09 0. 0670 
4 419 . 58 o. 1380 4 775 . 43 0 . 0464 
19 76 . 1 415 . 26 0 . 1085 l 984. 1 860 . 73 0 . 1281 
2 420. 11 0. 1021 2 845 . 34 0 . 0936 
3 424 . 46 0. 0956 3 878 . 31 0 . 1121 
4 453 . 94 o. 1383 4 853 . 24 0. 0706 
1977 . 1 463 . 07 0.1345 1985 . l 924 . 79 0 . 1285 
2 469 . 89 0 . 1267 2 92 9. 82 0. 1138 
3 460 . 44 0 . 0905 3 93 7. 01 0 . 1033 
4 536 . 74 0. 2072 4 934 . 49 0. 0855 
1978 . 1 525 . 50 0. 1582 
2 54 1. 92 0. 1606 
3 491. 36 0 . 0532 
4 5 75 . 94 0 . 1803 
1979.l 564 . 79 0 . 1366 
2 564 . 23 0. 11 53 
3 597.1 9 0 . 1462 
4 629 . 53 o. 1678 
1980 . 1 646 . 75 0.1 669 
2 638 . 05 0. 1304 
3 649 . 3 7 0 . 1258 
4 66 9.08 0 . 1323 
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Table 3.3. Estimated DM equat ion: DMt = a0 + a 1DMt-l + a2 Th~t - 2 
+ a3Th~t-3 + a4DMt-4 + a5Di~t-5 + a6DMt-6 + a7FEDVt 
Variables 
Intercept 
DMt- 1 
DM 
t - 2 
DM 
3 t -
DM 
4 t -
DM 
5 t -
DM 6 t-
yl(t - 1) 
yl(t - 2) 
yl(t-3) 
+ a8Yl(t - 1) + a9Yl(t - 2) + alOyl(t-3) + Et 
Coefficient 
(1) 
- 0 . 019 
0 . 511 
0.111 
-0 . 230 
0.297 
-0.017 
0.238 
0 . 166 
0 . 071 
-0 . 011 
-0 . 063 
T-ratio Coefficient 
-0.132 -0.003 
3 . 508* 0 . 516 
0. 764 0 . 085 
- 1.829 - 0.245 
2.068* 0.320 
-0 . 109 -0. 066 
1 . 883 0.265 
3 . 062* 0.175 
0.993 o. 049 
-0 . 141 -0.051 
-0.862 
(2) 
*Significant at the five percent significance level. 
T-ratio 
- 0 . 021 
3.558* 
0 .601 
-1. 968 
2.285* 
- 0 . 447 
2 . 173·1< 
3 . 305 
o. 73 7 
-0 . 807 
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Therefor e , joint F- tests of as = as = a9 = 0 in equation (1) and 
as = a9 = 0 in equation (2) on Table 3. 3 were applied . As shown in 
Table 3.4 , the F values were 0 . 4S42 and 0 . 3573, respectively . As both F 
values a re smaller than the critical values of 2. S8 and 3. 27 , we failed 
to r eject the hypo t hesis t hat lagged values of output do not have 
i mpact s on contemporaneous monetary growth rates. As a result , our 
money gr owt h equation contains only two kinds of explana t or y 
variabl es --FEOV and lagged values of monetary growth (DMs ) . 
Deletion of insigni ficant l agged variables of DM Once the 
lagged real output variables are excluded , the monetary gr owt h 
regression equation was estimated solely depending on FEDV and DM ' s as : 
DM = - 0 . 020 + 0 . 518DM l + 0 . 065DM 
2 
- 0 .19 7DM 
3 
+ 0 . 276 , 
t t - t - t -
( - 2 . 234) (3 . S77) ( 0 .491) ( - l.Sl6) 
Mt_4 - 0 . 037DMt _5 + 0 . 275Dt\_6 + 0. 175FEDVt + E > t 
( - 0 . 269) (2 . 479) (3.56S) 
0. 6843 o.w. 1. 921 , 
( ) t -ra t io, 
(2 . 329) 
where t he br acketed figures a re the t -rat i os f or the relevant estimated 
coefficients . The estimated coefficients of DMt _2 and DMt - S are small 
and the t - ratios are insignificant (see Table 3.5). 
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Table 3 . 4. Test results of goodness of fit for the lagged values o f 
GNP 
Tests 
H0 :a 7=a8=a9=o 
H0 :a 7=a8=o 
a 
Fq 
( n - k) 
F- values 
F334=0 . 4842a (Fc =2. 88)b 
F235 =0.3573 (Fe =3 . 27) 
(SSER - SSEF)/q 
SSEF/ ( n - k) 
bF = cr itical F values at the five percent level . 
c 
Table 3 . 5. Estimated coefficients of I»! equation without 
output 
Coeffic ient t - ratio St and ard error 
I n te r cept - 0 . 020 - 2 . 234 0.009 
OM 
t - 1 0 . 518 3 . 877 0. 134 
OM 
t - 1 
0 . 065 0.491 o. 133 
OM 
t - 3 
- 0 . 197 - 1. 816 o. 108 
OM 
t - 4 0 . 276 2.329 o. 119 
OM 
t - 5 
- 0 . 037 -0.269 0 . 138 
OM 
t - 6 0.275 2.479 o. 111 
FEDV 
t 0. 175 3. 568 o . 049 
Prob . > F 
0.6955 
o . 7021 
lagged real 
Prob . ) T 
0 . 0316 
0 . 0004 
0 . 62 73 
0. 077 5 
0.0254 
0. 7894 
0 . 0179 
0 . 0010 
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Following the thrifty principle in economet rics, elimination of 
both variables from the right hand side of the equation was consider ed. 
A joint hypothesis test of a2 = a5 0 was made. The F value was 0. 3; 
the corresponding critical level was 3. 21. Because we failed to r eject 
the hypothesis, both DMt_2 and DMt_5 were r emoved from the equation. 
After r emoving the DM 
2 
and DM 
5
, the F statistic was calculated . 1 It 
t- t -
shows that t he r ema1n1ng DMs have significant impacts on DM. Therefore, 
the final estimated monetary growth equation is 
~~t = -0. 021 + 0 . 523DM l - 0.184DM 3 + 0 . 270DM I + 0 .2 91DM 6 
t- t- t-q t-
( - 2 . 534) (4 .71 5) ( -1. 845) (2 . 625) (3 .214) 
+ 0 . 178FEDVt + £t' (l S) 
(4 . 136) 
0. 6791 D. W. 1. 914, 
( ) = t-ratio. 
Estimated values of DM as anticipated monetary growth (EDM) were 
obtained from equation ( 15). Residuals of e quation ( 15) were calculated 
by subt r acting EDM from DM as unanticipated monetary growth (DMR) . 
Results are reported in Table 3 . 6 . 
l 
. . ~~9 = 8 . 7440, and the critical value at the five percent 
s1gn1f1cance level is F = 2.615. 
c 
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Table 3.6 . Values of Jlvl, JlvlR , and EDM 
Year DM EDM DMR Year DM EDM DMR 
1973 . 1 1982 .1 0. 0571 0. 0511 0.0060 
2 o. 11 03 2 0 . 0461 0 . 0520 - 0.0060 
3 0.0802 3 0. 0406 0. 0329 0. 0078 
4 0 . 0844 4 0.0365 0 . 0240 0. 0125 
1974 .1 0 . 0889 1983 .1 0 . 0344 0. 03 71 - 0 . 0027 
2 0. 1349 2 0 . 0459 o. 032 7 0. 0132 
3 o. 0711 3 0.0364 0 . 0359 0.0005 
4 0.0691 0.0560 0.0130 4 0 . 0351 0. 0234 0.0117 
1975 .1 0 . 0540 0 . 0516 1984.1 0 . 0368 0 . 0330 0.0038 
2 0. 0851 0 . 0763 0. 0088 2 0 . 0315 0.0314 0. 0001 
3 0 . 0442 0. 0613 - 0 . 0171 3 0 . 0293 0 . 0290 0 . 0002 
4 0. 0851 0. 0748 0 . 0103 4 0 . 0243 0. 0231 0. 0012 
1976 .1 0 . 0517 0. 0626 - 0 . 0109 1985.1 0.0101 0. 0295 - 0.0194 
2 0. 0424 0. 0593 - 0 . 0169 2 0 . 0201 0. 0180 0. 0021 
3 0 . 0101 o. 0304 - 0 . 0202 3 0 . 0100 0. 0222 - 0. 0122 
4 0. 0487 0. 0473 0. 0014 4 0 . 008 0. 0135 - 0 . 0055 
1977. l 0 . 0587 0.0476 0. 0102 
2 0.0656 0 . 0663 -0 . 0007 
3 o. 0393 0.0384 0. 0009 
4 0. 0472 0 . 0515 -0.0043 
1978 . 1 0 . 0594 0. 0385 0. 0209 
2 0. 0645 0 . 0635 0. 0010 
3 0 . 0464 0 . 0411 0. 0053 
4 0.06 75 0. 0565 0. 0010 
1979 . 1 0 . 0656 0. 0544 0. 0112 
2 0.0424 0. 0566 - 0 . 0142 
3 0 . 0406 0 . 0448 -0.0042 
4 0.0328 0. 0552 -0 . 0224 
1980 . 1 0 . 0609 0 . 0495 o. 0114 
2 0 . 0695 0. 0578 o. 0117 
3 0 . 0586 0. 0619 -0 . 0033 
4 0. 04 72 0. 0433 0.0039 
1981. 1 0 . 0419 o. 0492 -0.0073 
2 0. 0381 0. 0441 - 0. 0060 
3 0 . 0290 0. 0410 - 0. 0119 
4 o. 0372 0.0345 0.0026 
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Real output equation 
Regression on real output relative to natural trend The 
equation of real output relative to its natural trend as specified in 
the model set - up section , is 
where Y1 = Log(nominal GNP/GNP deflator). The estimated equation is: 
Y
1 
= 7. 6680 + 0. 0244D
1 
+ 0. 02220
2 
+ 0. 0430D
3 
+ 0. 0143T + 0 . 0004T
2 
(0 . 023) (0 . 0 15 ) (0 . 015) (0. 015) (0 . 004) (0 . 000) 
3· 
- O. OOOOlT • 
(0 . 000) 
Figures in parentheses are s tandard erro rs. Transit o ry output data was 
ob tained by using the actual Y1 minus estimated values of Y1 (Ylt - Ylt 
Reg r ession on transit ory output (Y2 ) 
, t 
The contribution of 
monetary policy to transitory output is the key issue in this study . 
So , the r eg ression of transitory output on the explanatory variables is 
the focus in testing money neutrality. 
The transitory output equation basically contains two explanatory 
variables--lagged values of transitor y output itself (Y 2 t - l ' Y2 t - 2 • • • 
••• ) and unanticipated monetary movements (and anticipated moneta r y 
~ovements if money is nonneutral). 
Lag length fo r lagged transitory output (Y 2) Lagged values of 
transit ory ou t put are used as explanatory variables due to costly 
adjustment . For example , last period transitory output may result from 
42 
monetary movements. Although agents can perceive these changes 
correctly in the current period, costly adjustment will prevent 
immediate precise adjustments in productive capital. Therefore, lagged 
Y
2 
may still have persistent effects on contemporaneous Y2. Two lagged 
values of Y were put into the equation with monetary shocks as 
2 
independent variables . The empirical result are reported on Table 3. 7. 
Table 3.7 shows that the estimate of the YZ(t-Z) was not 
significant, while the coefficient of the lagged value of Y2 was 
significant. Therefore, only YZ(t-l) was retained in the Y2 regression 
equation. 
Lag length for monetary shocks The choice of lag length for the 
monetary variable was based on the degrees of freedom . Seven observa-
tions were lost in estimating the ~~Rs, so data of DMR (o r EDM) only 
started from 1974:1V; in detrending and seasonally adjusting seven 
degrees of freedom were lost. The l onge r the lag l eng th of monetary 
variables , the more observations and degrees of freedom are lo st . 
Therefore, only contemporaneous and four lagged values of unanticipated 
(or anticipated) money were used. Estimates of the coefficients are 
r epor t ed in Tables 3.8 and 3 . 9., and tests of actual money effects, and 
anticipated and unanticipated monetary effects on o utput are reported in 
Table 3.10. The results show that at the 0.05 significance level ac tual 
mone y affected r eal output, and both unanticipated a nd anticipated money 
have impacts on real output . 
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Table 3 . 7. Results of Y2 regression equation 
Independent variables Equation (1) 
y2(t - l) 0.8584 
(3 . 49l)a 
y2(t - 2) 0 . 2197 
(l . 292) 
DMRt -0.901 
( - 0 . 31) 
DMRt-l 0.0910 
(0 . 346) 
DMRt _2 - 0. 0924 
(-0 . 356) 
DMRt-3 0 . 2792 
(l.080) 
DMRt _4 0. 4716 
( l. 754) 
aNumbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
Equation (2) 
0. 7869 
(8.994) 
-0.2347 
(- 0.878) 
0.1535 
(0 . 588) 
- 0 . 0877 
(- 0 . 334) 
0.2768 
(l.060) 
0. 4222 
(1.571) 
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Table 3.8. Regression Y2 on Th~R (without intercept ) : 
+ a5Y 2(t-l) ( i=O,l,2,3,4) 
Variable Coeff i cient (a.) l 
y2( t-l ) 0 . 7869 
DMRt - 0.2347 
DMR 
t - 1 
0. 153 5 
DMR 2 t-
- 0. 0877 
DMR 
t - 3 
0.2768 
DMR 
t-4 
0.4222 
aNumbers in parentheses are t -ratios. 
Table 3. 9 . Reg r ession Y2 on EDM (without inter cept) : Y2 
+ 65Y2(t - l) (i =O,l,2 , 3,4) 
Variable Coefficient ( 6 . ) 
l 
y2(t - 1) o. 8173 
EDM 
t 0.3658 
EDM 
t-1 - 0 . 4507 
EDM 
t-2 0 . 2040 
EDM 
t-3 
- 0.2087 
EDM 
t - 4 
0 . 1371 
aNumbers in par entheses are t -ratios . 
4 
L ai DMRt - i 
i=O 
(8 .994 ) a 
( - 0.878) 
(0 . 588) 
(-0.334) 
( l.060) 
( l.571 ) 
4 
L BiEDMt - 1 
i =l 
(9.454) a 
(1.205) 
( - 1. 578) 
(0 . 735) 
( - 0 . 774) 
(0 . 485) 
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Table 3 .1 0 . Results from tests of anticipated , unanticipated , and 
actual money g r owth impacts 
Hypothesis 
No unanticipated money impacts 
F value F 
c 
HO = ai = 0 5 . 3286 
5 
F
35 
= 2. 485 
( i =O , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4) Reject tt
0 
No ant icipated money impac t s 
e. = o 
1. 
6 . 4563 2. 485 
( i =O, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4) Reject H
0 
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Multicol linearity problem 
As lagged values of monetary shocks were used in the model , it l S 
very likely that multicollinearity exists between the explanatory 
variables in both the money growth equa tion and output equa tion . The 
following table (Tab l e 3.11.) repor ts the simple cor r elation 
coefficients between the DMs and FEDV in the monetary growth equation. 
The correlation between the dependent and independent variables are 
g i ven in the first r ow. 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981, p. 89) state that "mult i collinearity 
lS likely to be a pr oblem if the simple correlation between two 
variables is larger than the co rrelation of either or both variables 
with the dependent variable." The correlation between DM 1 and DM 3 t- t -
i s 0.56342; DM 
3 
and DM 
4
, 0.57903; DM l and FEDV , - 0 .57094; and 
t - t - t- t 
DM 
3 
and FEDV , - 0.36794, and all of these correlations are fairly 
t- t 
large. The high cor r elations r eveal that multicollinearity does exist . 
This co ll inearity causes the estimated coefficient to be inefficient (it 
A -1 
has a large variance of cr2(X ' X) ) . When we interpret the statistics, 
the t - ratios are no longer meaningful, so only a joint F-test was 
c alculated. For the same reason , the individual estimated coefficients 
of monetary movements (anticipated and unanticipated money) in the Y
2 
equation wer e ignor ed. Therefore, only the F statistics ln Table 3 . 10. 
were applied and the above mentioned three findings were reported. 
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Table 3.1 1. Co rrelation coefficients fo r the variables used 10 the 0.'1 
equation (1973: I-1985:IV) 
DM t-1 DMt-3 DMt - 4 DM t-6 FEDVt 
DM 0 . 64255 0.41970 0 . 62643 0 . 54375 - 0.27561 
DMt -1 1 0 . 56342 0 .37 755 0.36865 - 0 . 57094 
DM 
t-3 
1 0 . 57903 0 . 32424 -0. 36 794 
DM 
t-4 
1 0 . 4932 1 - 0 . 17744 
OM 
t-6 l - 0 . 23181 
FEDV 
t l 
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CHAPTER IV . CONCLUSION 
The econometric analysis leads us to the following conclusions: 
1. unanticipated money affects the output ; and 
2. anticipated moneta ry changes also have impacts on real output . 
The first finding was expected from the MRE pas tu lat ion, and because 
Taiwan is a developing country , the second finding was also expected . 
There are several possible reasons for the second finding, that 
anticipated monetary changes have impacts on real output. First, 
interest rates for savings and loans in Taiwan are se t by the Central 
Bank Interest Rate Committee, 1 whereas in the United States interest 
rates a re determined by open market operations . Changes in interest 
rates will change the macroeconomic structure (i . e., the IS and LM 
curves) and the r efo re affect real output . 
Second, monetary impacts on real ou tput might be caused by 
anticipated money movements in conjunction with government development 
strategy . In the 1970s, Taiwan's economic strategy was designed to 
encourage backward integration and the development of intermediate goods 
industries; in the 1980s the development of technology- intensive 
industries was encouraged . Favored industries get loans easier than 
other industries, and get lower interest rates than other loans . 
1 Although the rates were set up according to the supply and 
demand situation in money markets, both rates are suppressed relatively 
low compared to the equilibrium level for the purpose of promoting 
private investments in productive capital . 
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Structural changes at the micro l evel affected aggregate demand quantity 
and thus real output . 
The third sour ce may come from the flexibility of relative prices . 
Taiwan is a sma ll, open , price - taking economy . The prices of its t r aded 
goods will be determined independ ently of domestic monetary movements , 
so on l y the price of nontraded goods can be affected by monetar y 
disequilibrium. Monetary expansion will cause the prices of nontrad ed 
goods to inc rease, r aising real output in the nontraded goods sector and 
reducing real output in its t rad ed-goods sector (Blejer and Fernandez, 
1980 , pp. 82 - 95). 
Suggestion fo r Further Research 
As pointed out in Chapter III the multicollinearity problem 
i nt er fered with proper interpretation of the t-ratio . If this prob 1 em 
could be corrected, we may be able to explain the relationship between 
the explanatory variables and real output more properly. 1 And, if the 
issue of traded and nontraded goods were properly modeled, t he money 
nonneutral effect s in Taiwan might be explicitly revealed on the both 
traded and nontraded goods sectors . 
An extension of this study that would give us more valuable 
economic i nsights would be t o examine effects of monetar y neutrality on 
the individual mic r o sectors of the economy . For example, t he study of 
the s tructural changes in individual industries corresponding to 
1Mishkin's estimation procedure may be a good way to avoid this 
collinearity problem. 
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monetary shocks could give the gov ernmen t a direction to approach its 
economic development goal and provide mor e infor mation in price and 
quantity determination to individual industries . 
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